Abstract. In this paper, we study the security proofs of GCM (Galois/Counter Mode of Operation). We first point out that a lemma, which is related to the upper bound on the probability of a counter collision, is invalid. Both the original privacy and authenticity proofs by the designers are based on the lemma. We further show that the observation can be translated into a distinguishing attack that invalidates the main part of the privacy proof. It turns out that the original security proofs of GCM contain a flaw, and hence the claimed security bounds are not justified. A very natural question is then whether the proofs can be repaired. We give an affirmative answer to the question by presenting new security bounds, both for privacy and authenticity. As a result, although the security bounds are larger than what were previously claimed, GCM maintains its provable security. We also show that, when the nonce length is restricted to 96 bits, GCM has better security bounds than a general case of variable length nonces.
Introduction
GCM (Galois/Counter Mode of Operation) is the authenticated encryption mode of blockciphers designed by McGrew and Viega [26, 27] . The mode is based on the counter mode encryption and the polynomial hash function, and the designers presented proofs of security both for privacy and authenticity [26, 27] . It was selected as the NIST recommended blockcipher mode in 2007 [15] , and is widely used in practice, e.g., in [1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 14, 17, 19, 20, 25, 33, 34] .
The security of GCM has been extensively evaluated. Ferguson pointed out that a forgery is possible if the tag length is short [16] . Joux showed that a part of the secret key can be obtained if the nonce is reused [21] . Handschuh and Preneel discussed weak keys of GCM and presented generalizations of Joux's attack [18] . Saarinen pointed out that GCM has more weak keys than previously known, and used the weak keys for forgery attacks [32] . See also [31] for comprehensive discussions on various aspects on GCM.
Despite aforementioned attacks, it is widely considered that the provable security results of GCM are sound, in the sense that the previous attacks do not contradict the claimed security bounds by the designers, and that no flaw in the proofs has been identified. Some of these attacks show the tightness of the security bounds, and others are outside the security model (e.g., nonce reuse). Therefore, there is no attack that undermines the security bounds or their proofs.
GCM uses the counter mode encryption, and the initial counter value is derived from a nonce, where there are two different ways to generate the initial counter value depending on the length of the nonce. When the nonce length is 96 bits, the initial counter value is the nonce padded with a constant. When the nonce length is not 96 bits, the polynomial hash function is applied to the nonce to obtain the initial counter value. In order to prove the security of GCM, one has to show that the probability of a counter collision is small. McGrew and Viega presented a lemma showing the upper bound on the probability in [27] , which is the basis for both the privacy and authenticity proofs.
⋆ A preliminary version of this paper appears in the proceedings of CRYPTO 2012. This is the full version.
In this paper, we first point out that the claimed lemma cannot be valid; the probability of a counter collision is larger than claimed. We show concrete counter-examples of two distinct nonces that invalidate the lemma. It turns out that the original security proofs (both for privacy and authenticity) of GCM contain a flaw, and hence the claimed security bounds are not justified.
We next translate the above observation into a distinguishing attack. The attack is simple and efficient. However, from the practical perspective, the success probability of the attack is insignificantly small, and it does not contradict the security bounds by the designers. On the other hand, the success probability is large enough to invalidate the main part of the privacy proof. In more detail, there are three terms in the privacy bound of GCM. The first one comes from the difference between a random permutation and a random function, the second one is the main part of the privacy proof that bounds the distinguishing probability of ciphertexts of GCM based on a random function from random strings (of the same lengths as the ciphertexts), and the last one bounds the forgery probability. The success probability of our distinguishing attack is larger than the second term, invalidating the main part of the privacy proof. Consequently, the security of GCM is not supported by the proofs.
Then a very natural question is whether the proofs can be repaired, or more generally, whether the security of GCM can ever be proved. In order to answer the question, we first introduce a combinatorial problem of quantifying a cardinality of a certain set of bit strings. The problem belongs to one of the problems of counting the number of output differences with non-zero probability of S-functions [29] , which presents tools to analyze ARX systems (e.g., see [23] ). One possible approach to solve the problem is to follow [29] (or [22] ). In this paper, we take another approach and present a solution to the problem by giving a recursive formula that quantifies the cardinality. Basing on the solution, we present new security bounds on GCM, both for privacy and authenticity.
As a result, although the security bounds are larger than what were previously claimed, we show that GCM maintains its provable security. We also present provable security results of GCM when the nonce length is restricted to 96 bits, in which case GCM has better security bounds than a general case.
Preliminaries
Let {0, 1} * be the set of all bit strings, and for an integer ℓ ≥ 0, let {0, 1} ℓ be a set of ℓ-bit strings. For a bit string X ∈ {0, 1} * , |X| is its length in bits, and |X| ℓ = ⌈|X|/ℓ⌉ is the length in ℓ-bit blocks. The empty string is denoted as ε. Let 0 ℓ and 1 ℓ denote the bit strings of ℓ zeros and ones, respectively. We use the prefix 0x for the hexadecimal notation, e.g., 0x63 is 01100011 ∈ {0, 1} 8 . We also write (0x0) ℓ to mean 0 4ℓ . For a bit string X and an integer ℓ such that |X| ≥ ℓ, msb ℓ (X) is the most significant ℓ bits (the leftmost ℓ bits) of X, and lsb ℓ (X) is the least significant ℓ bits (the rightmost ℓ bits) of X. For X, Y ∈ {0, 1} * , we write X ∥ Y , (X, Y ), or simply XY to denote their concatenation. For a bit string X whose length in bits is a multiple of ℓ, we write its partition into ℓ-bit strings as (X [1] , . . . , X [x] ) Algorithm Fig. 1 . The encryption and decryption algorithms of GCM the finite field with 2 n elements. An n-bit string a n−1 . . . a 1 a 0 ∈ {0, 1} n corresponds to a formal polynomial a(x) = a n−1 + a n−2
GCM-E
. When n = 128, the irreducible polynomial used in GCM is p(x) = 1 + x + x 2 + x 7 + x 128 .
Specification of GCM
We follow [27,28] with some notational changes. GCM is parameterized by a blockcipher E : K × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n and a tag length τ , where 64 ≤ τ ≤ n. We write GCM[E, τ ] for GCM that uses E and τ as parameters. Let GCM-E be the encryption algorithm and GCM-D be the decryption algorithm, which are defined in Fig. 1 . GCM uses the counter mode encryption and the polynomial hash function over GF(2 n ) as its subroutines. They are denoted CTR and GHASH and are defined in Fig. 2 . Figure 3 illustrates the overall structure of GCM-E.
GCM-E takes a key K ∈ K, a nonce N ∈ {0, 1} * , associated data A ∈ {0, 1} * , and a plaintext M ∈ {0, 1} * as inputs, and returns a pair of a ciphertext C ∈ {0, 1} * and a tag T ∈ {0, 1} τ as an output, where
. GCM-D takes a key K ∈ K, a nonce N ∈ {0, 1} * , associated data A ∈ {0, 1} * , a ciphertext C ∈ {0, 1} * , and a tag T ∈ {0, 1} τ as inputs, and returns either a plaintext M ∈ {0, 1} * or the symbol ⊥ indicating that the inputs are invalid. We write
In the definition of CTR, for a bit string X ∈ {0, 1} n , inc(X) treats the least significant 32 bits (the rightmost 32 bits) of X as a non-negative integer, and increments this value modulo 2 32 , i.e., inc(X) = msb n−32 (X) ∥ str 32 (int(lsb 32 (X)) + 1 mod 2 32 ).
For r ≥ 0, we write inc r (X) to denote the r times iterative applications of inc on X, and inc −r (X) to denote the r times iterative applications of the inverse function of inc on X. We use the convention that inc 0 (X) = X. In the definition of GHASH, the multiplication in line 7 is over GF(2 n ). We remark that, if
Security Definitions
An adversary is a probabilistic algorithm that has access to one or more oracles. we fix a model of computation and a method of encoding. The query complexity includes the number of queries, the total length of queries, and the maximum length of queries, and a more precise definition is given in each theorem statement. Following [10, 30] , we consider two security notions for GCM: privacy and authenticity. For privacy, we consider an adversary A that has access to a GCM encryption oracle or a randombits oracle. The GCM encryption oracle takes (N, A, M ) and returns (C,
The random-bits oracle, $, takes (N, A, M ) and returns (C, T )
where the first probability is defined over the randomness of A and the choice of K, and the last is over the randomness of A and the random-bits oracle. We assume that A is nonce-respecting: A does not make two queries with the same nonce. For authenticity, we consider an adversary A that has access to GCM encryption and decryption oracles. The GCM decryption oracle takes (N, A, C, T ) and returns M ← GCM-D where the probability is defined over the randomness of A and the choice of K, and the adversary forges if the GCM decryption oracle returns a bit string (other than ⊥) for a query (N, A, C, T ), but (C, T ) was not previously returned to A from the encryption oracle for a query (N, A, M ). As in the privacy notion, we assume that A is nonce-respecting: A does not make two queries to the encryption oracle with the same nonce. We remark that nonces used for the encryption queries can be used for decryption queries and vice-versa, and that the same nonce can be repeated for decryption queries. Without loss of generality, we assume that A does not make trivial queries: if the encryption oracle returns (C, T ) for a query (N, A, M ), then A does not make a query (N, A, C, T ) to the decryption oracle, and A does not repeat a query to the decryption oracle.
In [27] , McGrew and Viega analyzed the security of GCM, and there are differences between the above security notions. In [27] , for privacy, the adversary has access to both the encryption and decryption oracles, while we chose to follow a more standard notion [10, 30] where the privacy adversary has access to the encryption oracle only. Another difference is the assumption about the nonce reuse. In [27], the adversary is not allowed to reuse a nonce within decryption queries (but nonces used in encryption queries can be used in decryption queries and vice-versa), while our adversary can reuse nonces within decryption queries.
For the blockcipher E : K × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n , we consider the PRP notion [24] . Let Perm(n) be the set of all permutations on {0, 1} n . We say that P is a random permutation if P $ ← Perm(n). We define
where the probabilities are defined over the randomness of A, and the choices of K and P , respectively. We write GCM[Perm(n), τ ] for GCM that uses a random permutation P as a blockcipher E K , and we write the corresponding encryption and decryption algorithms as GCM-E P and GCM-D P , respectively. We also consider GCM that uses a random function as E K , which is naturally defined as the invertibility of E K is irrelevant in the definition of GCM. Let Rand(n) be the set of all functions from {0, 1} n to {0, 1} n . We say that F is a random function if F $ ← Rand(n), and write GCM[Rand(n), τ ] for GCM that uses F as E K . We write the corresponding encryption and decryption algorithms as GCM-E F and GCM-D F , respectively. In this section, we first review a lemma in [27] that was used to derive the provable security results on GCM. Consider GCM[Rand(n), τ ], GCM with E K being a random function F , and the privacy notion for it. Let (N 1 , A 1 , M 1 ) and (N 2 , A 2 , M 2 ) be two encryption queries, where
, produced from the counter mode encryption based on F , are uniformly distributed over ({0, 1} n ) m 1 and ({0, 1} n ) m 2 , respectively. Furthermore, F (I 1 [0]) and F (I 2 [0]) are uniform random n-bit strings, and hence the probability distribution of strings returned from the encryption oracle is identical to that from the random-bits oracle.
Therefore, in order to prove the security of GCM, one has to show that the probability of a counter collision,
In [27, Lemma 3] , McGrew and Viega showed the following lemma (notation has been adapted to this paper).
Lemma 1 ([27]). For any
Based on the lemma, [27, Theorem 1] states that the privacy advantage of GCM[Perm(n), τ ], GCM with E K being a random permutation P , is at most
and [27, Theorem 2] states that the authenticity advantage is at most
where q is the maximum number of queries (either encryption or decryption queries), σ is the total length in bits of the plaintexts (either in encryption queries or returned from the decryption oracle), ℓ N is the maximum length in bits of nonces in queries (either encryption or decryption queries), and ℓ is the maximum value of |A j | + |C j |, where A j and C j are the associated data and ciphertext, respectively, in the j-th query (either in decryption queries or returned from the encryption oracle). Note that the definitions of privacy and authenticity advantages are slightly different from ours, as explained in Sect. 4. It is easy to see that the lemma is correct when r = 0:
2 ) = 0 n , and we see that the left hand side is a non-trivial polynomial in L of degree at most ℓ N + 1 over GF(2 n ), and hence there are at most ℓ N + 1 values of L that satisfy the equality.
However, for r ̸ = 0, it is not clear if inc r (GHASH L (ε, N 1 )) is a polynomial of degree at most ℓ N + 1 even if this is the case for GHASH L (ε, N 1 ), and the analysis for this case is missing in the proof of [27, Lemma 3] . The lemma is crucial in that it is used in the proofs for both privacy and authenticity.
Invalidating [27, Lemma 3]
Let r = 1, N 1 = (0x0) 17 ∥ 0x2 = 0 68 ∥ 0010, and N 2 = (0x0) 17 ∥ 0x6 = 0 68 ∥ 0110, where
where 14 , and V = (0x0) 30 ∥ 0x48. In binary, U 1 = 0 68 ∥ 0010 ∥ 0 56 , U 2 = 0 68 ∥ 0110 ∥ 0 56 , and V = 0 120 ∥ 01001000. Now [27, Lemma 3] states that Pr L [Coll L (r, N 1 , N 2 )] ≤ 2/2 n , i.e., (3) has at most two solutions. However, one can verify (with the help of some software, e.g., [3] ) that (3) has 32 solutions, which are listed
] ≥ 32/2 n holds, and hence [27, Lemma 3] cannot be valid. We present one more observation regarding the counter-example. Consider
where the values of U 1 , U 2 , and V are as above. Then one can verify that (4) has 31 solutions, and that (5) has 30 solutions, which are also listed in Appendix A. The 93 values of L are all distinct, and are also different from 0 n , which is a solution for
We remark that we exclude the case r = 3 since Coll L (3, N 1 , N 2 ) has no solution. In Appendix A, we present other examples of (N 1 , N 2 ) that satisfy (6) and also invalidate [27, Lemma 3] . We next show that the above observation is not merely spotting of a subtle error in the proofs of GCM. The observation can actually be translated into a distinguishing attack.
Distinguishing Attack
Consider GCM with E K being a random function F , and the privacy notion for it. We remark that the analysis of this idealized version of GCM is essential since the main part of the privacy proof is the analysis of this case. Let N 1 and N 2 be as in Sect. 5.2,
Let A be an adversary that has access to an oracle O which is either the GCM encryption oracle or the random-bits oracle. A works as follows.
First, A makes two queries, (N
, then we see that A outputs 1. Otherwise the probability distributions of [5] , and C 2 are exactly the same as those of returned by the random-bits oracle. In particular, (7) is satisfied with the same probability for the GCM encryption oracle and for the random-bits oracle. Therefore, we have
Now using the notation of (1) and (2), our adversary has the following query complexity: q = 2, σ = 6n, ℓ N = 72, and ℓ = 5n. Then (1) is 50/2 n + 80/2 n + 12/2 τ = 130/2 n + 12/2 τ . Therefore, the attack does not contradict the claimed privacy bound (1).
However, (1) allows the use of the GCM decryption oracle, and rounding up the details makes it sufficiently large so that our attack is tolerated in appearance. Now if we take a closer look at (1), the second term, 80/2 n , is the main part of the privacy proof that bounds Adv priv GCM[Rand(n),τ ] (A), while the first term is from the application of the PRP/PRF switching lemma [11] and the last term bounds the forgery probability due to the use of the decryption oracle. Therefore, the above attack does invalidate the main part of the privacy proof, and we also see that it invalidates the second term of (2), which is 88/2 n .
We have already shown that the claimed bound on Pr L [Coll L (r, N 1 , N 2 )] is invalid, which implies that the claimed security bounds, (1) and (2), are not justified. Furthermore, the above attack invalidates the main part of the privacy proof. Therefore, at this point, it is fair to conclude that the security of GCM is not supported by the proofs. We note that, although our attack does not work with 96-bit nonces, this statement holds even in this case since (1) and (2) cover a general case including the case that the nonce length is restricted to 96 bits.
Remarks
Our attack is efficient. It uses two oracle calls, and the lengths of the queries are short. However, the success probability, although large enough to invalidate the second terms in (1) and (2), is insignificantly small in practice and it has a limited practical implication. We also note that many standards require or recommend using GCM with 96-bit nonces, in which case the attack does not work. Indeed, in many RFCs, such as RFC 4106 (IPsec) [34] , 5647 (SSH) [20] , 5288 (SSL) [33] , the nonce length is fixed to 96 bits, and RFC 5084 [19] and 5116 [25] recommend 96-bit nonces. For IEEE standards, some strictly require 96-bit nonces (e.g. IEEE 802.1AE [5] ) and some do not (e.g. IEEE P1619.1 [6] ). There are cases where non-96-bit nonces are allowed, including NIST SP 800-38D [15] , ISO/IEC 19772 [7] , PKCS #11 [4] , and most software libraries (e.g., Gladman's code [17] , CRYPTO++ [14] , Java SE [2] , and BouncyCastle [1] ). Finally, NSA Suite B Cryptography includes GCM with a strong recommendation (but not mandatory; see e.g. [8] ) of using it with 96-bit nonces.
We emphasize that, even when non-96-bit nonces are allowed, our attack has a limited practical implication. However, it does undermine the provable security of GCM, making its provable security open. A very natural question is then whether the security of GCM can ever be proved. In the following sections, we present an affirmative answer to this question.
Towards Repairing the Proofs

Combinatorial Problem
To prove the security of GCM, the first step is to derive the upper bound on Pr
, which can be shown by ignoring the least significant 32 bits. In this section, we derive a better upper bound on Pr L [Coll L (r, N 1 , N 2 )], and we first introduce a combinatorial problem for this goal.
For 0 ≤ r ≤ 2 32 − 1, let
We also let α r 
Relation to the Security of GCM
We show that identifying α r gives the upper bound on Pr 
Lemma 2. For any
Recall that
and lsb 32 (GHASH L (ε, N 1 )) ∈ Y j . We see that (11) is a non-trivial equation in L of degree at most ℓ N + 1 over GF(2 n ), and hence it has at most ℓ N + 1 solutions. From (10), we obtain the lemma. ⊓ ⊔
Deriving α r and α max
The problem introduced in Sect. 6.1 can be solved by exhaustively evaluating (9) for all 0 ≤ r ≤ 2 32 − 1, which is computationally costly. Another possible approach is to follow the framework in [29] (or to use tools in [22] ). Instead of following these approaches, in this section, we present a recursive formula to efficiently compute α r . Let r ≥ 0 be a given integer, ℓ be the number of runs of ones in the binary representation of r (e.g., if r is 00110101 in binary, then ℓ = 3), and v ℓ be an integer
Note that, when v ℓ = 32, α r is equal to A ℓ . The next proposition gives an efficient recursive formula to compute A ℓ .
Proposition 1. For any ℓ ≥ 1,
where In Appendix B, we present an elementary proof of the proposition. Given Proposition 1, it is not hard to experimentally derive α max by directly evaluating (12) . We have α max = 3524578, where α r = α max holds when r = 0x2aaaaaab, 0xaaaaaaab, 0x55555555, and 0xd5555555. From Lemma 2 and since 3524578 ≤ 2 22 , we obtain the following corollary.
If the upper bound of r is smaller than 2 32 − 1, then depending on the value, the constant, 2 22 , in Corollary 1 can be replaced by a smaller constant. Specifically, there are 303 values of 1 ≤ r ≤ 2 32 − 1 that satisfy max{α 0 , . . . , α r−1 } < α r , and a list of the 303 values of (r, α r ) can be used to obtain a smaller constant. The list can be found in Appendix C. Table 1 (left) and shows the relation between the range of r max and the corresponding constant β(r max ), where r max is the upper bound of r and β(r max ) is the upper bound of α r . For example, if r max = 2 10 = 0x400, then it is within the range of 0x0000012b-0x00000454 and hence β(r max ) = 2 11 . See also Fig. 4 for a graph showing the relation between r max and β(r max ).
We have the following corollary.
Corollary 2. For any
We note that for r max = 0, from α 0 = 1, β(r max ) is defined to be 1. In Appendix C, we discuss that a more precise value of β(r max ) can be obtained with the complete list of the 303 values of (r, α r ).
Repairing GCM Security Proofs
In this section, basing on the results of the previous section, we present new security bounds on GCM. We also present overviews of the proofs. 
Privacy Result
In the privacy result, if A makesueries (N 1 , A 1 , M 1 ) , . . . , (N q , A q , M q ), then the total plaintext length is m 1 + · · · + m q , and the maximum nonce length is max{n 1 , . . . , n q }, where |N i | n = n i and |M i | n = m i . We have the following information theoretic result. Theorem 1. Let Perm(n) and τ be the parameters of GCM. Then for any A that makes at mostueries, where the total plaintext length is at most σ blocks and the maximum nonce length is at most ℓ N blocks,
Observe that the security bound is essentially the same as the original one (1), except that we have a constant, 2 22 , in the second term, and we do not have a term that corresponds to the forgery probability. We next present a corollary showing that GCM has a better security bound if the nonce length is restricted to 96 bits.
Corollary 3. Assume that the nonce length is restricted to 96 bits. Then,
Let E be a blockcipher secure in the sense of the PRP notion. Then the corresponding complexity theoretic results, where E is used in place of Perm(n), can be obtained by a standard argument (see e.g. [9] ). In the next section, we present an intuitive proof overview of Theorem 1. A complete proof is presented in Appendix D. A proof of Corollary 3 is obtained by modifying the proof of Theorem 1, and is omitted.
Proof Overview of Theorem 1
Suppose that A has access to the GCM encryption oracle. We first replace the random permutation P by a random function F . The difference between the two advantage functions is at most (σ + q + 1) 2 /2 n+1 from the PRP/PRF switching lemma [11] . Next, suppose that A has made i − 1 queries (N 1 , A 1 , M 1 ), . . . , (N i−1 , A i−1 , M i−1 ), obtained (C 1 , T 1 ), . . . , (C i−1 , T i−1 ), and  is now making the i-th query (N i , A i , M 
holds for some 1 ≤ i ≤ q, the distribution of the output of the GCM encryption oracle (based on the random function F ) is identical to that of the random-bits oracle, and hence A is unable to distinguish between the two oracles. It can be shown that the probability of (13) is at most 2 22 q(σ + q)(ℓ N + 1)/2 n by using Corollary 1. The result is obtained by summing up the two above-mentioned probabilities.
Authenticity Result
If A makes q encryption queries ( 
We have the following information theoretic result.
Theorem 2.
Let Perm(n) and τ be the parameters of GCM. Then for any A that makes at most q encryption queries and q ′ decryption queries, where the total plaintext length is at most σ blocks, the maximum nonce length is at most ℓ N blocks, and the maximum input length is at most ℓ A blocks,
As in the privacy result, the bound is essentially the same as the original one (2), except that we have a constant, 2 22 , in the second term. The next corollary shows that we have a better security bound if the nonce length is restricted to 96 bits.
Corollary 4.
Assume that the nonce length is restricted to 96 bits. Then,
The corresponding complexity theoretic results can be obtained based on the PRP notion of a blockcipher E by a standard argument (see e.g. [9] ). We present an intuitive proof overview of Theorem 2 in the next section, and a complete proof is presented in Appendix E. A proof of Corollary 4 can be obtained from the proof of Theorem 2, and is omitted.
Proof Overview of Theorem 2
We replace the random permutation P by a random function F . From the PRP/PRF switching lemma [11] , we have a term (σ + q + q ′ + 1) 2 /2 n+1 . We then consider the probability of a counter collision as in the privacy proof, but this time, we consider the counter values used for decryption queries as well. The probability can be shown to be at most 2 22 (q + q ′ + 1)(σ + q)(ℓ N + 1)/2 n by using Corollary 1. Under the condition that there is no counter collision, the adversary is essentially asked to forge a message authentication code (N, A, C) → F (g(N ) )⊕GHASH L (A, C), where g(N ) = N ∥ 0 31 1 if |N | = 96, and g(N ) = GHASH L (ε, N ) if |N | ̸ = 96. The probability can be shown to be at most q ′ (ℓ A + 1)/2 τ , and we obtain the theorem by summing up the three probabilities.
Better Security Bounds
Use of Corollary 2. Suppose that, either in privacy or authenticity notions, A makes q encryption queries (N 1 , A 1 , M 1 ) 
With the same notation as in Theorem 2, the right hand side of (14) can be improved to the following bound.
[
Note that when a ≪ 2 n we have δ n (a) ≈ (1 + a 2 /2 n+1 ). It was shown that δ n (a) ≤ 1.7 when a ≤ 2 64 and n ≥ 128 [13] . Hence, for example, if 1 < q ′ ≤ q ≤ σ, n = τ = 128, and σ+q+q ′ < 2 64 , we obtain the bound (17 · 2 22 qσℓ N + 4q ′ ℓ A )/2 128 . See Appendix C for more discussions on the better security bounds.
Conclusion
In this paper, we studied the security proofs of GCM. We first pointed out that the proofs contain a flaw, and translated the observation into a distinguishing attack that invalidates the main part of the privacy proof. We then showed that the proofs can be repaired by presenting new privacy and authenticity bounds. The bounds are larger than what were previously claimed in a general case of variable length nonces, but they are smaller when the nonce length is restricted to 96 bits. Many standards require or recommend using GCM with 96-bit nonces for efficiency reasons. Our results suggest that restricting GCM to 96-bit nonces is recommended from the provable security perspective as well. This follows [31] , where GCM with 96-bit nonces is recommended as the use of variable length nonces increases the proof complexity and the proofs are infrequently verified. We remark that since our attack only invalidates the second terms of (1) and (2), it does not exclude a possibility that the original security bounds, (1) and (2), can still be proved, and it would be interesting to see if our security bounds can be improved. (3) 0x7f6db6d2db6db6db6db6db6492492492 0x7f6db6dadb6db6db6db6db6492492492 0x81b6db776db6db6db6db6dadb6db6db6 0x81b6db676db6db6db6db6dadb6db6db6 0xbe00003c000000000000003fffffffff 0xbe00001c000000000000003fffffffff 0xc16db6aadb6db6db6db6db1b6db6db6d 0xc16db6eadb6db6db6db6db1b6db6db6d 0x3fb6db876db6db6db6db6d5249249249 0x3fb6db076db6db6db6db6d5249249249 0x000001dc00000000000001c000000000 0x000000dc00000000000001c000000000 0x7f6db56adb6db6db6db6d8e492492492 0x7f6db76adb6db6db6db6d8e492492492 0x81b6dc076db6db6db6db6aadb6db6db6 0x81b6d8076db6db6db6db6aadb6db6db6 0xbe000edc0000000000000e3fffffffff 0xbe0006dc0000000000000e3fffffffff 0xc16dab6adb6db6db6db6c71b6db6db6d 0xc16dbb6adb6db6db6db6c71b6db6db6d 0x3fb6e0076db6db6db6db555249249249 0x3fb6c0076db6db6db6db555249249249 0x000076dc00000000000071c000000000 0x000036dc00000000000071c000000000 0x7f6d5b6adb6db6db6db638e492492492 0x7f6ddb6adb6db6db6db638e492492492 0x81b700076db6db6db6daaaadb6db6db6 0x81b600076db6db6db6daaaadb6db6db6 0xbe03b6dc0000000000038e3fffffffff 0xbe01b6dc0000000000038e3fffffffff 0xc16adb6adb6db6db6db1c71b6db6db6d 0x00000004000000000000000000000000 A Solutions of (3), (4), and (5), and Examples of (N 1 , N 2 ) Satisfying (6)
In Table 2, Table 3, and Table 4 , we show a list of values of L that satisfy (3), (4), and (5), respectively. We see that the 93 values from these lists are all distinct, and are different from 0 n . The counter-example presented in Sect. 5.2 was found by experimentally searching over the values of U 1 , U 2 , and V . We started by searching over random U 1 , U 2 , and V , and found that the values of the form
, and V ∈ {0, 1} n have many examples that satisfy (6) , where X, Y ∈ {0, 1} 8 , 0 ≤ i ≤ 15, and int(V ) = 8j for some i + 1 ≤ j ≤ 16 but j ̸ = 12. The examples include the following values:
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B Proof of Proposition 1
With the same notation in Sect. 6, let u ℓ = (s ℓ + · · · + s 1 ) + (t ℓ + · · · + t 1 ), and r ′ be an integer satisfying str u ℓ (r ′ ) = 0 s ℓ 1 t ℓ . . . 0 s 1 1 t 1 , i.e., r ′ is the integer defined by taking the most significant u ℓ bits of r. Then we see that
In what follows, without loss of generality, we make the assumption that s 0 = 0 (and hence u ℓ = v ℓ ).
We first show the following lemma.
Lemma 3.
If ℓ = 1, s 1 = 0, and str v 1 (r) = 1 t 1 , then
By a similar argument, we obtain the following lemma. 
Lemma 4.
From Lemma 4, (16) 
It takes t 1 values from Lemma 4 if
We next consider the case where
where Y ′′′ ∈ {0, 1} t 1 , and from Lemma 4, Y ′′′ takes t 1 values when Y ′ is fixed and Y ′′ ranges over int(1
As for the most significant s 2 + t 2 bits, we have a carry coming from the least significant s 1 + t 1 bits, and hence we need to consider
Since int(0
We see that the least significant t 2 bits of (18) 
, and for any fixed Y ′′ within the range, from Lemma 3,
We next consider the case where 
As for the most significant t 2 bits, we have a carry coming from the least significant s 1 + t 1 bits. This fixes We are now ready to present the proof of Proposition 1.
Proof (of Proposition 1).
The proof is based on an induction on ℓ. First, if ℓ = 1, then we obtain Proposition 1 from Lemma 3 and Lemma 4. Suppose that Proposition 1 holds for ℓ = j ≥ 1. If s j ≥ 1, the number of Y ∈ {0, 1} v j such that the most significant bit of str v j +1 (int(Y ) + r mod 2 v j +1 ) ⊕ (0 ∥ Y ) equals 1 is obtained by the difference between A j with s j being replaced with s j + 1 and A j , which is
Now we show that Proposition 1 holds for
Then from the induction hypothesis and by following the same argument to the proof of Lemma 6, A j+1 is the sum of ( (1 v j ) ), where the latter value is obtained using (19) . Therefore,
On the other hand, if s j+1 = 0, then by following the same argument to the proof of Lemma 7, we see that A j+1 is the sum of t j+1 A j (for Y ranges over Y ′ ∈ {0, 1} s j+1 +t j+1 and
and we thus obtain the proposition.
⊓ ⊔ 
C List of (r, α r ) and Applications
We present a list of (r, α r ) that satisfies max{α 0 , . . . , α r−1 } < α r in Table 5 and in Table 6 . The list has 303 values, and it corresponds to Table 1 (left). The list of the 303 values can be used to obtain a more precise value of β(r max ) appears in Corollary 2.
Let r max be the upper bound of r as in Corollary 2, and let r 1 and r 2 be two consecutive values of r in the list. If r 1 ≤ r max < r 2 , then we have β(r max ) = α r 1 , i.e., for any 0
As noted in Sect. 6.3, for r max = 0, we have β(r max ) = 1 from α 0 = 1, and we also note that for r max ≥ 0x2aaaaaab, we have β(r max ) = 3524578. We present a graph in Fig. 5 showing the relation between r max and β(r max ) obtained from Table 5 and Table 6 . 
Better Privacy Result. As discussed in Sect. 7.5, Theorem 1 can be improved by using Corollary 2, and Table 5 and Table 6 give a more precise value of β(r max ) than the value obtained from Table 1 .
We summarize our privacy result by using the following notation. Suppose that A makesueries (N 1 , A 1 , M 1 ), . . . , (N q , A q , M q ) , where |N i | n = n i , |A i | n = a i , and |M i | n = m i . Then the total plaintext length is m 1 + · · · + m q , the maximum plaintext length is max{m 1 , . . . , m q }, the maximum nonce length is max{n 1 , . . . , n q }, and the total input length is (a 1 +m 1 )+· · ·+(a q +m q ).
We state our result in the complexity theoretic form. Table 5 and Table 6 total input length is at most σ A blocks, there exists an adversary A ′ such that
where A ′ makes at most σ + q + 1 queries, r max is any value satisfying ℓ M ≤ r max , and β(r max ) is obtained from Table 5 and Table 6 
where A ′ makes at most σ+q+q ′ +1 queries, r max is any value satisfying ℓ M ≤ r max , and β(r max ) is obtained from Table 5 and Table 6 (20), we obtain
Recall that δ n (a) = (1 − (a − 1)/2 n ) −a/2 . Furthermore, if the nonce length is restricted to 96 bits, then (20) becomes
The right hand side of (21) is generally smaller than that of (20) for most parameters. However, we do not know if this holds for all parameters. We also note that the last term of (22) is, for most parameters, smaller than the right hand side of (15) .
D Proof of Theorem 1
Without loss of generality, we assume that A is deterministic and makes exactlyueries. Recall that GCM[Perm(n), τ ] is GCM that is based on a random permutation P $ ← Perm(n) and GCM[Rand(n), τ ] is GCM based on a random function F $ ← Rand(n). We follow the game playing proof technique in [11] . From the PRP/PRF switching lemma [11] , have 
as we need one call to P or F for L, and at most m i + 1 calls for the i-th query (N i , A i , M i ), and we have ∑ 1≤i≤q (m i + 1) ≤ σ + q. We next define two games, Game G 0 and Game G 1 , in Fig. 6 to derive the upper bound on Adv priv GCM[Rand(n),τ ] (A). In Fig. 6 , Game G 1 includes the boxed statements and Game G 0 does not. Observe that Game G 0 simulates the random-bits oracle, and that Game G 1 simulates the GCM encryption oracle using the lazy sampling of F , where F is regarded as an array, and the array F (X) is initially undefined for all X ∈ {0, 1} n . We maintain a set I F in order to keep the record of domain points that have already been used. The set is updated when F (X) ← Y is executed for some X and Y . We also maintain a flag, bad, which is initialized to false. We see that Game G 0 and Game G 1 are identical until the flag gets set, and hence, from the fundamental lemma of game playing [11] , we have 
Game G0
Game G1 initialization 
and we obtain the claimed bound from (23), (24), (25) , and (26) .
⊓ ⊔
We remark that the proof of Corollary 3 is obtained from Pr[A G 0 sets bad] = 0.
Game G0
Game G1 initialization We evaluate Pr[A G 0 sets bad 1 ]. The q ′ decryption queries can be divided into two sets. Q 1 is a set of decryption queries where the corresponding nonces are also used in encryption queries, and Q 2 is a set of decryption queries where the nonces are used only for decryption queries. To evaluate Pr[A G 0 sets bad 1 ], we consider the encryption queries first (which effectively include the decryption queries in Q 1 ), followed by the decryption queries in Q 2 . Then we have the following four cases to consider.
